measure of state asset limit policy: the length of time since a liberalized policy has been adopted.
In doing so, it is recognized that states introduced new asset limits at different time-points and that it might take time for the target population to learn about and adapt to policy changes. The new measure of policy changes in this study also broadens the approach to understanding the ways in which new public policies affect the target population. vehicle asset and at $1,000 for countable assets (cash on hand, values in saving and checking accounts, bonds, stocks, and vehicle values that exceed vehicle asset limit) at the federal level and prohibited state governments from raising these limits (Powers 1998) . The vehicle asset limit increased to $1,500 per household later and remained at that level until state governments began to raise their limits after the enactment of the Family Support Act of 1988 (Corporation for Enterprise Development 2002).
BACKGROUND
Restrictive asset limits have been blamed for low levels of asset accumulation among poor households. In order to qualify for asset-tested public assistance programs, low-income households are required to spend down or to maintain their financial and vehicle assets below the limits. Current and potential recipients, therefore, face strong disincentives to saving. Existing empirical research suggests that this saving disincentive has operated for various asset-tested income transfer programs and contributes to low saving rates among low-income households (Gruber and Yelowitz 1999; Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995; Powers 1998; Ziliak 2003) . For example, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey, Powers (1998) studied the effects of the federalization of the AFDC program's asset-testing policy in 1981 that dramatically lowered asset limits in many states. She finds that higher asset limits are strongly associated with higher savings among current and potential welfare recipients: an increase of $1 in asset limits raised a female head's savings by $0.25.
Recognizing the disincentives of asset limits, both federal and state governments began to liberalize AFDC/TANF asset tests in the early 1990s. The Family Support Act of 1988 allowed states to request a waiver from the federal government to raise asset limits. The PRWORA of 1996 abolished the federal asset limits for TANF, allowing states to create their own thresholds (Savner and Greenberg 1995 [ Table 1 About Here] A couple of existing studies have empirically tested whether increased asset limits facilitated asset accumulation among the target population of likely welfare participants (Sullivan 2006; Hurst and Ziliak 2006) . Using PSID data, Hurst and Ziliak (2006) found that gaps in asset accumulation between likely and unlikely welfare program participants (femaleheaded households with children vs. other types of households) do not significantly differ
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1 Some states introduced special account programs for welfare recipients during the 1990s. These special accounts have separate and higher asset limits than general accounts but withdrawals are limited to certain types of activities (e.g., higher education). This study does not include this policy measure because it often overlaps with state Individual Development Accounts (IDA), an asset-building program (matched saving program) for low-income households. IDA programs probably affect the asset accumulation of the comparison group in this study (e.g. maleheaded households) as well as the target population (female-headed households with children).
Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation between states with and without generous asset rules. These findings apply for various asset measures, including financial assets, possession of a bank account, and ownership of a house or
business. An exception is vehicle ownership: more generous countable asset limits appear to significantly promote likely welfare recipients' vehicle ownership. Sullivan (2006) These two studies focus mainly on the degree of liberalization in asset tests, i.e. the actual dollar amounts of asset limits. While these measures are valid and valuable, they may not fully capture the effects of policy changes. Since it may take time for the target population to learn about and adapt to policy changes, analyses should also take into account the elapsed time since a policy change has occurred. In addition, states that adopted new asset limits early often have lower asset limits than states introducing new asset rules later. For example, California increased its countable asset limit to $2, 000 in 1994, which is much lower than that of North Dakota ($8,000) or Nebraska ($6,000). These two states raised their countable asset limits in 1998, four years later than California. Given the considerable variation in when state governments adopted new asset policies, the length of time since policy change occurred may be even more illuminating than the extent of policy changes at the time of a study.
Center for Social Development
This article builds on and expands prior studies of asset tests and asset accumulation among likely welfare recipients. In addition to measures of policy changes used in the two existing studies (Sullivan 2006; Hurst and Ziliak 2006) , this study includes a new measure of policy changes: the elapsed time after policy adoption. With this new policy measure, this study estimates the effectiveness of relaxed asset limits more broadly than previous studies.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY

A. Data, Sample, and Descriptive Statistics
This study combines household data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) with state-level data capturing variation in state-level policies and economic conditions. The PSID initially interviewed a nationally representative sample of 4,802 families in 1968. Since then, the PSID has interviewed respondents about economic and demographic characteristics annually until 1997 and biennially thereafter. When weighted, the sample is designed to be representative of the non-immigrant U.S. population as a whole (Hill, 1992) .
The PSID collects data on households' assets and liabilities in its wealth supplement. The PSID's wealth data contain extensive information regarding assets and liabilities. The wealth data in the PSID is reported to be of high quality in comparison to other survey data (Curtin, Juster, and Morgan 1989) . The PSID collected wealth data every five years between 1984 and 1999 (in 1984, 1989, 1994, and 1999) and biennially after 1999. This study uses the PSID wealth data collected in 1994 and 2001 and other household data collected between those years.
This study employs the same sample selection criteria used in Hurst and Ziliak (2006) .
The sample is limited to households headed by the same heads who maintained the same marital status throughout the observation period (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) Sullivan (2006) use the same criteria in defining the target population. The target group received welfare at much higher rates than the comparison group.
Forty-eight percent of the households in the target group received welfare at least once during the observation period whereas 2 percent of the households in the comparison group did (Please refer to Table 2 for details).
In addition, this study creates an additional comparison group, consisting of male-headed households with children (N=565). This comparison group is used in some of analyses to check robustness of findings. As in the main comparison group, this group's welfare program participation was very low (about 2 %). This study also creates another sample for robustness
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2 The only difference from Hurst and Ziliak's (2006) sample is that this study does not exclude those with missing wealth data. The PSID imputed missing data on wealth and did not provide any indicator of imputation at the time when the author retrieved data.
check: a sample composed of households headed by those with less than 13 years of schooling.
This sample consists of 914 households (188 female-headed households and 726 male-headed household and female-headed households without children). The difference in welfare participation rates is larger between target and non-target groups in this sample: 56 percent of the target group ever received welfare between 1994 and 2001 while only two percent of the comparison group did.
B. Measures
The major independent variables in this study are state-level asset limits in welfare program. The state welfare policy data were created using various sources, including Savner and Greenberg (1995) and the Urban Institute's Welfare Rules Database (Urban Institute 2005). In creating the state asset limit policy dataset, this study counts policies that applied to the majority of current welfare recipients for the majority of a year as instances of policy change.
Accordingly, a policy change is counted only if it was applied statewide, not limited to certain experimental sites in a state. For those states that set different asset limits by family size, this study uses the asset limit that is likely to have applied to the majority of welfare families (e.g. an asset limit for a family with two or more members instead of that for a single individual). This study uses asset limits on current welfare recipients, not those on welfare applicants. Due to these additional restrictions, the state policy measures used in this study are slightly different from those reported in Hurst and Ziliak (2006) .
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3 Hurst and Ziliak (2006) use asset limits different from those used in this study for some states. They use an average of two countable asset limits ($5000, an average of $4,000 for single individuals and $6,000 for households with two or more members) for Nebraska and use asset limits for welfare applicants for New Hampshire and Oregon. Their countable asset limit for Washington ($4,000) is different from $3,000 in the Urban Institute (2005) and State Policy Demonstration Project (http://www.spdp.org/medicaid/table_6.htm). Hurst and Ziliak (2006) As briefly mentioned above, this study develops two separate sets of asset policy measures. The first type of measure, which is the dollar amount of the asset limit (as it applies to countable assets and vehicles) is identical to that used in Sullivan (2006) and Hurst and Ziliak (2006) . For countable asset limit, the variable measuring the actual amount of limits is used in analyses. Since several states eliminated the vehicle asset limit during the 1990s, this study creates two vehicle asset limit policy variables: one indicates whether a state has a vehicle asset limit or not (1 if a state has a vehicle asset limit and 0 otherwise) and the other is a continuous measure of the actual amount of vehicle asset limit for states with vehicle asset limits (0 for states without limits). The second set of asset limit policy variables is unique to this study: the number of years since a new asset limit was introduced for each type of asset. This variable ranges from zero (for states that made no changes to asset limits) to seven years for countable asset limits and from two to seven years for vehicle asset limits.
The main dependent variables are financial assets, bank account ownership, and vehicle assets. This study focuses on financial and vehicle assets because they are counted toward asset limits in determining welfare eligibility. Welfare systems do not count non-financial assets (e.g., home values) or debt into countable assets when determining welfare eligibility (Corporation for Enterprise Development 2002). Accordingly, the household's financial and vehicle asset holdings are the appropriate measure in estimating the impact of asset policy changes. This study pays attention to bank account ownership since opening a bank account is often the first step in accumulating financial assets and other types of wealth (Beverly et al. 2003) . The bank account ownership variable is a dichotomous variable that assigns a value of one to households that report having any positive value in checking or saving accounts and a value of zero otherwise. The vehicle ownership variable is created in the same way (1 if a household reports to own at least a vehicle and 0 otherwise).
C. Analytic Methods: Difference-In-Difference Approach
This study employs a difference-in-difference approach. This approach assesses the effectiveness of a policy through assessing whether the impact of a policy change on the target
Center for Social Developmentgroup (likely welfare recipients) is different from the impact on the non-target population (those with low probability of receiving welfare). The approach thus controls for unobserved confounding factors, such as state residents' propensity toward saving. The analytical model is as follows:
where S i represents an asset measure for an individual household i P i indicates a vector of asset limit policies in the state of an individual household i T i is a dummy for the target group X i is a vector of control variables, including household and state characteristics ε i is the residual for individual household i
The coefficient on the interaction term between state asset limit and high-risk of receiving welfare, P T × β , is the primary interest of this study. It identifies whether and to what extent the target and comparison groups react in different ways to changes in asset limit policies.
It is expected that the effect of asset limit policies, should they have any effect, will be concentrated among those with a higher-risk of receiving welfare. If asset limit policies encourage asset accumulation, especially among the target population, then P T × β should be positive and significant, indicating that the state policy environment stimulates asset accumulation among the target group in a significantly different way from how it affects the comparison group.
The statistical method of estimation varies with the type of dependent variable. For the dichotomous dependent variable (e.g. positive change in the level of financial assets, or bank account or vehicle ownership), this study uses a linear probability model. Results using a logistic regression or a linear probability model with robust standard errors do not differ substantively from those reported in this paper. In the analyses with the continuous variable measuring the amount of changes in financial assets between the two observation periods, this study employs regressions with bootstrapped standard errors, following Hurst and Ziliak's (2006) . Regression analyses with robust standard errors do not produce disparate results from those reported in this paper. Since a few cases with extreme values in the continuous dependent variable may influence analysis results (Greene 2003) , this study runs a series of additional analyses. This study runs the same analyses reported here after deleting the top and bottom 1 % of the sample and runs median regressions (Greene 2003) . These analyses produce results similar to those reported in this paper. The target group's wealth is much lower than that of the comparison group. The average financial asset value among the former was only about $2,000 in 1994 while the average value was almost $20,000 among the latter. Only 38 percent possessed a bank account and 62 percent owned a vehicle in 1994 among the target group, whereas 77 percent and 87 percent of the comparison group did, respectively. Interestingly, gaps in bank account and vehicle ownership narrowed between the two groups: the gap fell from 39% in 1994 to 23% in 2001 for bank account ownership and from 25% to 16% for vehicle ownership.
[ Table 2 About Here] Table 3 reports multivariate analysis results on two dependent variables: the probability of saving financial assets (positive changes in financial assets) and amount of change in financial assets between 1994 and 2001. Following the example of Hurst and Ziliak (2006) , this paper estimates the effect of countable asset limits, first. This study conducts two sets of analyses to capture the effects of the two distinct types of policy measures. Model 1 uses the dollar amount of countable asset limit as in Hurst and Ziliak (2006) and Model 2 utilizes the number of years since a liberalized asset limit was adopted in a state, a measure unique in this study.
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4 This study runs a series of additional models to check the robustness: a model with state dummy variables, a model using state asset limits for welfare applicants instead of those for welfare recipients, and a model including IDA program variable (whether a state had state-funded IDA programs or not in 2000). Results from these models are not substantially different from those reported in this paper. Table 3 shows the results of three sets of analyses: 1) analyses using all male-headed households and female-headed households without children as the comparison group, 2) analyses based on male-headed households with children as the comparison group, and 3) a sample consisting of households whose heads have less than 13 years of school. Table 3 reports only key coefficients of interest: asset limit policy variables, the target population, and the interaction terms [Full estimation results are available from the author upon request].
[ Table 3 About Here]
As shown in the first panel of results, which estimates the probability that a household will save any financial assets, the coefficient on the interaction term between the dollar amount of the countable asset limit and the target population indicator is not statistically significant in all three analyses. This result suggests that a higher countable asset limit does not significantly increase the target population's probability of saving financial assets. Results based on the different measure of asset policy (the number of years elapsed from the adoption of new limit) tell a different story. The interaction term between the policy variable and the target population indicator is significantly positive in all three types of analyses (p<0.05). These results suggest that the longer a liberalized policy change had been in effect, the greater the probability that a likely welfare recipient had saved financial assets.
The second panel of Table 3 reports results using the continuous measure: the dollar amount of change in financial assets between the two observed periods. The results based on the dollar amount of countable asset limit are consistent with those in Hurst and Ziliak (2006) . The coefficients of the interaction term between the target population indicator and policy variable are not statistically significant in any of three models. In addition, the coefficients of the interaction term have different signs across models (two are negative and one is positive) as shown in Hurst and Ziliak (2006) . The measure of the elapsed time does not show any significant Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation effect, either. The coefficients of the interaction term have positive signs (as expected) in all three models, unlike those based on the dollar amount of asset limit. The coefficients of this measure range from 1055 to 3883, suggesting that one year early adoption of higher asset limit may have increased the target population's saving at least by $1,054. Table 4 summarizes the results using the natural logarithm of the dollar amount of financial assets accumulated during the observation period [Full estimation results are available from the author upon request]. The Heckman model used in these analyses produces two sets of estimations: one estimates how changes in asset limit policies influence the level of financial asset savings among those who succeeded in saving financial assets (first panel), and the other assesses how these policy changes affect one's probability of being selected into the sample in the first panel (probability of having positive saving) (second panel). Results from these analyses suggest that the dollar amount of the asset limit has a significantly positive effect on the target population's amount of savings accumulation (as displayed by the statistically significant coefficients of the interaction term in all six models including this measure). At the same time, the elapsed time since asset limits were liberalized significantly increases one's probability of saving a positive amount of financial assets (as shown in significantly positive coefficients of interaction terms in all six models that include this measure).
[ Table 4 About Here]
These results analyzing financial asset accumulation indicate that asset limit policies affect potential welfare recipients' financial asset accumulation in fascinating ways. The more time that a liberalized policy has existed, the more likely the target population is to save, suggesting that they need time to learn about and adapt to the policy change. Among those who managed to save, the more liberalized the countable asset limit policy in the state of residence, the more financial assets female-headed households with children were able to save, provided they saved anything. If we can assume that those who succeeded in saving are more likely to be aware of increased asset limits and to adapt to the policy change than others, this finding suggests that the level of generosity in asset limit policy may influence the level of financial asset accumulation among the target population who have learned about and utilized the opportunities created by this policy change. Unlike Hurst and Ziliak (2006) , this study includes those who did have own a bank account or a vehicle in 1994 in the sample because it cannot be assumed without empirical evidence that states' decisions about asset limits are not correlated with their residents' needs for and actual ownership before policy changes. Therefore, this study uses the full sample in analyzing the relationship between relaxed asset limit policies and these two types of asset ownership.
Recognizing that those who owned a bank account or a vehicle in 1994 were more likely to do so in 2001, this study controls for the ownership status of respective property in the base year in the models.
[ Table 5 About Here]
As shown in Table 5 , the study produces results identical to those in Hurst and Ziliak (2006) regarding the relationship between bank account ownership and the amount of countable asset limit. When measuring the state policy with the traditional measure used in Hurst and Ziliak (2006) , liberalized asset policy does not show a significant effect on the target population's probability of having a bank account in 2001. However, the elapsed time since liberalizing asset limits again shows a statistically significant effect. The interaction term between the policy variable reflecting time and the target population indicator has a significantly positive coefficient at the 0.05 level in all three models, indicating that the more time that has passed since liberalization, the more likely it is that likely welfare recipients possess bank accounts, ceteris paribus. These results confirm the utility of considering the time dimension as well as the dollar amount of a policy change in order to understand how a policy affects its target population. Table 5 also reports results estimating the probability of vehicle ownership. Relaxed asset limit policy, either measures with the dollar amount of asset limit or years since a new policy was adopted, does not show a significant effect on vehicle ownership among female-headed households with children. Findings on vehicle ownership in this study differ from those reported by Hurst and Ziliak (2006) who reported that a relaxed countable asset limit raised vehicle ownership among the target population in a statistically significant way. The discrepancy between the two studies can be attributed to several factors. While Hurst and Ziliak (2006) limited their sample to those who did not own a vehicle in 1994, this study uses the full sample and controlled for vehicle ownership in the base year. As described fully in footnote 3, this study assigned slightly different values to some states' countable asset limits from those by Hurst and Ziliak (2006) . This study weighted the data with 2001 family weight variable whereas Hurst and
Ziliak (2006) did not. When replicating Hurst and Ziliak's (2006) analysis using the same sample selection criteria (only those who did not own a vehicle in 1994) and same definition of policy variable without weighting the data, this study obtained results similar to theirs: the dollar amount of countable asset limits has a significantly positive association with the target population's probability of having an automobile. Accordingly, the different results between the two studies appear to be due to the sample selection criteria, slightly different state asset limit values, and the use of the sample weight.
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Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation
In order to evaluate whether the relationships between countable asset limit policy and the target population's asset accumulation reported above may be artifacts of other policies, this study conducts analyses that include other welfare reform policies: vehicle asset limit policies, time-limits on lifetime welfare receipt, and state maximum welfare benefit. Like other analyses reported above, these analyses replicate Hurst and Ziliak's (2006) models. Table 6 summarizes the results for this robustness check, using three different types of asset accumulation that show significant impacts of liberalized asset limit policy as shown in Tables [ Table 6 About Here]
The results of this study suggest there is no statistically significant relationship between vehicle asset limits and target population's probability of saving financial assets and of owning a bank account. None of interaction terms between vehicle asset policy variables (measured either with the dollar amount or years since the adoption of a new limit) has a statistically significant
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terms, however, have the same sign as those reported in this paper in the analyses that show significant effects of new asset limits on asset accumulation between 1994-2001 (positive coefficient of the interaction with the number of years after the adoption of a new policy in the positive saving and bank account analyses and positive coefficient of the interaction term with the amount of asset limit in the logarithm of financial asset saving analysis).
Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation coefficient. Liberalized vehicle asset limit policies, however, show significantly negative effects on the natural logarithm of the dollar amount of financial asset change: both interaction terms are large and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Analysis result on the dollar amount of financial asset change also show a similar pattern of the relationship with vehicle asset limits: a positive coefficient of the interaction term with having a vehicle limit and significant and negative coefficient of the interaction term with the dollar amount of vehicle limit [not reported
in Table but 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines the impact of liberalized asset limits on asset accumulation among likely welfare recipients, using two distinct measures of policy liberalization: 1) the generosity of asset limit policies and 2) the elapsed time during which these liberalized policies have been in place. The analyses of this study show that liberalized asset limit policies are positively associated with the target population's probabilities of saving financial assets and possessing bank accounts. The longer a liberalized countable asset limit has been in place, the more likely the target population is to achieve a positive change in financial assets and to possess a bank account. Analysis results also suggest that the level of generosity in asset limit policy may influence the level of financial asset accumulation among members of the target population provided they can save anything. Considering even modest levels of assets can improve the quality of life among low-income families (Edin 2001) , findings of this study support that we maintain or expand the liberalization of asset eligibility rules in various public assistance programs in order to promote long-term well-being of low-income households.
This study may help understand contrasting findings between the two recent studies (Hurst and Ziliak 2006; Sullivan 2006) and an older study (Powers 1998) . Using the amount of asset limit measure, Hurst and Ziliak (2006) and Sullivan (2006) have shown that asset limits have essentially no effect on financial asset accumulation. These recent findings run in stark contrast to Powers' (1998) study showing that higher AFDC asset limits had a significantly positive association with likely welfare recipients' saving.
The differences between Powers (1998) First, the nature of the changes in asset limit policies was quite different: in one case, asset limits were reduced (made more stringent); in the other, asset limits were raised (liberalized). Powers (1998) examined the impact of changes in asset limit policies after the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) was passed. In this case, asset limits were reduced in many states, and welfare recipients, especially those with wealth beyond the newly reduced asset limits, probably would have learned about policy changes soon after the OBRA took effect because welfare offices would have informed them about their loss of eligibility. In contrast, Hurst and
Ziliak (2006) and Sullivan (2006) investigated the effects of increased asset limits during the 1990s. In this case, the process by which welfare recipients would learn about policy changes would have been quite different. Welfare offices do not always provide complete information about eligibility rule changes to individuals who are not at risk of losing eligibility, and at any case, learning about the changes would have likely taken more time (Kahn and Polakow 2000) . 
